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HEARSAY: PART 1 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
_,~ This is the first of a series of articles on the hearsay 




:r:: Ohio Evidence Rule 801 defines hearsay. The first part 
> of the rule sets forth a traditional definition of hearsay. 
) Hearsay is defined as a written or oral statement, in-
luding conduct intended to be an assertion, made by a 
declarant out-of-court and offered for the truth of the 
assertions contained in the statement. In contrast, subdi-
vision (D) represents an important change in Ohio law; it 
provides that certain declarations - prior statements 
and admissions- that would otherwise fall within the 
definition of subdivisions (A) to (C) are not hearsay and, 
~ consequently, are not excludable as hearsay. 
Res gestae 
The Rules of Evidence avoid the use of the term res 
gestae, a confusing phrase which encompasses both 
evidence that is not hearsay and evidence that is hearsay 
but may fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. See generally 6 Wigmore, Evidence§ 1767, at 255 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976) ("The phrase res gestae has long 
been not only entirely useless, but even positively harm-
ful"). As the Supreme Court has remarked, "For the sake 
of clarity, it is better to avoid the use of the generalized 
phrase res gestae when referring to a distinct excep-
tion ... " State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 89 n.3, 524 
N.E.2d 466 (1988). 
Underlying theory 
Hearsay evidence is excluded because it is considered 
unreliable. The accuracy of a witness' testimony 
depends on the witness' perception, memory, narration, 
and sincerity. When a witness testifies at trial these four 
factors are subject to cross-examination. In addition, the 
witness is required to take an oath, and the jury has an 
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on 
the stand. These conditions- cross-examination, oath, 
and presence at trial - are usually lacking when hearsay 
evidence is presented. The absence of these safeguards 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
supports the exclusion of hearsay. See McCormick, 
Evidence§ 245 (3d ed. 1984); 5 Wigmore, Evidence§ 
1362 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
DEFINITION OF STATEMENT 
Rule 801(A) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if 
it is intended by him as an assertion." The first part of this 
definition is not controversial. Oral and written assertions 
clearly present the hearsay dangers -lack of cross-exam-
ination concerning the declarant's perception, memory, 
narration, and sincerity. See Hallworth v. Republic Steel 
Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 354-56, 91 N.E.2d 690, 693-94 
(1950) (learned treatise hearsay); Geller v. Geller, 115 Ohio 
St. 468, 154 N.E. 727 (1926) (letter hearsay); Lambert v. 
State, 105 Ohio St. 219, 136 N.E. 921 (1922) (information 
supplied by a third party hearsay); Smith v. Young, 109 
Ohio App. 463, 168 N.E.2d 3 (1958) (conversation hearsay). 
Assertive conduct 
Rule 801 also treats nonverbal conduct intended as an 
assertion (assertive conduct) as hearsay. McCormick 
provides the following commentary and illustration: 
[l)t must be observed that the line of cleavage between 
conduct and statements is one that must be drawn in 
the light of substance, rather than form. No one would 
contend, if, in response to a question "Who did it?", 
one of the auditors held up his hand, that this gesture 
could be treated as different from an oral or written 
statement, in the application of the hearsay rule. Obvi-
ously, though described in terms of conduct, the 
actions are as much a part of the speaker's effort at 
expression as his words are ... McCormick, Evidence 
596 (2d ed. 1972). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801 
provides another illustration: "Some nonverbal conduct, 
such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a 
lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in 
nature, and to be regarded as a statement." 
The above examples of assertive conduct illustrate 
why such conduct is considered hearsay. They present 
the hearsay dangers inherent in perception, memory, 
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narration, and sincerity untested by cross-examination. 
Nonassertive conduct-implied assertions 
Conduct that is not intended by the declarant to be an 
assertion is not encompassed by the definition of "state-
ment" in Rule 801(A). Accordingly, the hearsay rule is not 
a bar to the admissibility of evidence of nonassertive 
conduct. Non assertive conduct is sometimes referred to 
as "implied assertions." The leading case of Wright v. 
Doe D'Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837), held implied 
assertions to be hearsay. See McCormick, Evidence § 
250 (3d ed. 1984). Rule 801(A) rejects this position. Thus, 
for example, evidence of flight from the scene of a crime 
is not hearsay under Rule 801 because such conduct is 
not intended to be an assertion. See generally State v. 
Strub, 48 Ohio App.2d 57, 35 N.E.2d 819 (1975); State v. 
Fields, 35 Ohio App.2d 140, 300 N.E.2d 207 (1973); State 
v. Whitley, 17 Ohio App.2d 159, 245 N.E.2d 232 (1969). 
Although the federal drafters recognized that nonas-
sertive conduct may present some of the hearsay 
dangers, they believed that such conduct did not present 
a significant risk of insincerity and should, therefore, not 
be classified as hearsay. 
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested 
with respect to the perception, memory, and narration 
(or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advisory 
Committee is of the view that these dangers are mini-
mal in the absence of an intent to assert and do not 
justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. 
No class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrica-
tion, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with 
assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving rise to 
the non-verbal conduct are such as virtually to elimi-
nate questions of sincerity. 
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory 
that it is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a 
preliminary determination will be required to determine 
whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so word-
ed as to place the burden upon the party claiming that 
the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases 
will be resolved against him and in favor of admissibili-
ty ... Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 801. 
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS 
Rule 801(C) defines hearsay as a "statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing ... " Hence, an out-of-court statement 
does not lose its hearsay character simply because the 
declarant later becomes a witness at trial and testifies 
about the statement. For example, if an eyewitness to a 
crime makes a statement at the time of the crime and 
later testifies at trial, the prior statement is hearsay if 
offered for the truth of the assertion; to be admissible, it 
must fall within an exception. See Rules 803 and 804. 
OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH 
Rule 801(C) defines hearsay as "a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted." This definition is consistent with 
the prior Ohio cases. In Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 
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124 N.E.2d 1.40 (1955), the Supreme Court held: 
"Testimony of a witness as to a statement or declaration 
by another person is hearsay testimony where that state-
ment or declaration is offered or used only to prove the 
truth of the matters asserted therein." Jd (syllabus, para. 
1)); accord, State v. Nabozny, 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 375 
N.E.2d 784 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 
811 (1978) (tape recording not offered for truth of asser-
tions); State v. Lane, 49 Ohio St.2d 77, 83-84, 358 N.E.2d 
1081, 1087 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 
(1978) (telephone conversation not offered for truth of 
assertion). 
· .· "IW1e,relevance of an out-of-court statement is that the 
statement was made, rather than for the truth of the 
assertion contained in the statement, the statement is not 
hearsay. State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 348, 528 
N.E.2d 910 (1988) ("A statement is not hearsay if it is 
admitted to prove that the declarant made it, rather than 
to prove the t~uth of its contents."). In such a case, the 
hearsay dangers are not present. The declarant's 
perception, memory, narration, and sincerity are not criti-
cal because the relevance of the statement does not 
depend on the veracity of the declarant. See McCormick, 
Evidence§ 249 (3d ed. 1984); 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 
1766 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). 
Courts and commentators have recognized a number 
of examples of statements not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted. Several are discussed below. 
Verbal acts 
The verbal acts rule involves verbal conduct "to which 
the law attaches duties and liabilities." McCormick, 
Evidence§ 249 (3d ed. 1984). In other words, the uttering 
of certain words has independent legal significance 
under the substantive law. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 
1710-TChadbOI.Jrn rev. 1976). For example, words 
constituting the offer and acceptance of a contract are 
verbal acts. These statements are not offered to prove 
the truth of the assertion; they are offered in evidence 
only to show that the words were uttered. Ct. Leggett v. 
State, 15 Ohio 283 (1846). Statements constituting an 
offer of a bribe, an illegal solicitation, or entrapment are 
other examples. See also Staff Note ("Words constituting 
conduct are not hearsay, e.g., words of a contract, libel, 
slander, threats and the like."). 
Statements offered to show effect on hearer 
In many cases a person's state of mind- his knowl-
edge, belief, good faith, reasonableness- is an issue. 
See McCormick, Evidence§ 249 (3d ed. 1984); 6 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1789 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). For 
example, if an accused claims self-defense, his reasona-
ble fear of the victim becomes an issue. Accordingly, 
statements made to the defendant regarding the victim's 
dangerous or violent character are relevant to show the 
accused's subjective state of mind. These statements are 
offered not to show that the victim was, in fact, a danger-
ous or violent person, but only to show that such informa-
tion was communicated to the defendant. See McGraw v. 
State, 123 Ohio St. 196, 174 N.E. 741 (1931); State v. 
Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301, 82 N.E. 1082 (1907); Upthe-
grove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); Marts v. State, 26 
Ohio St. 162 (1875). 
Declarant's state of mind 
A person's mental state is often a consequential or 
material issue. If that person makes a statement that 
manifests his state of mind, the statement is relevant. 
t Frequently, such statements are hearsay, but fall within 
- the exception for presently existing state of mind. See 
Rule 803(3). In other cases, the statements show the 
declarant's state of mind only circumstantially. In these 
cases the statement is not offered to prove the truth of 
the assertion and thus does not implicate the hearsay 
rule. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1790 (Chadbourn rev. 
1976). One of the more difficult examples involves state-
ments offered by a defendant to establish insanity. 
Evidence that the defendant has stated "I am the 
Emperor of Africa" is offered not to prove that the defen-
dant is the Emperor of Africa, but rather as evidence of 
the defendant's insane delusions. As such, it would 
appear not to invoke the hearsay prohibition. This analy-
sis, however, is not free from criticism. See 6 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1766, at 250 and n. 1 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); 
Hinton, State of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 394, 397-98 (1934). 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Rule 801(0)(1)(a) provides that certain types of prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible as substantive 
evidence. The rule accomplishes this result by defining 
such statements as non hearsay. Five conditions must be 
satisfied before a prior statement is admissible under the 
rule: (1) the declarant must testify, subject to cross-
" examination, at the trial or hearing; (2) the prior state-
ment must be inconsistent with the witness' trial testimo-
ny; (3) the prior statement must have been given under 
oath; (4) the prior statement must have been "subject to 
cross-examination by the party against whom the state-
ment is offered'; and (5) the prior statement must have 
been "subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, 
or other proceeding, or in a deposition ... " 
The rule represents a change in Ohio law. Under prior 
law, prior inconsistent statements were admissible only 
for impeachment; such statements were offered not for 
the truth of the assertion contained therein, but only to 
show that the statement was made and is inconsistent 
with the witness' trial testimony. Prior inconsistent state-
ments that do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 
801(0)(1)(a) are still admissible for impeachment; Rule 
613 sets forth the foundational requirements for admissi-
bility of these statements. 
Rule 801(0)(1)(a) differs from its federal counterpart. 
Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require that the prior 
statement had been subject to cross-examination at the 
time it was made. The Ohio rule is based on the version 
of the federal rule that was proposed by the House 
Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee Report 
contains the following commentary: 
The Rule as amended draws a distinction between 
types of prior inconsistent statements ... and allows 
only those made while the declarant was subject to 
cross-examination at a trial or hearing or in a deposi-
tion, to be admissible for their truth ... The rationale 
for the Committee's decision is that (1) unlike in most 
other situations involving unsworn or oral statement 
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there can be no dispute as to whether the prior state-
ment was made; and (2) the context of a formal 
proceeding, an oath, and the opportunity for cross-
examination provide firm additional assurances of the 
reliability of the prior statement. H.R. Rep. No. 650, 
93d Gong., 1st Sess., (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. 
Code Gong. & Ad. News, 7075, 7086-87. 
Statements made at a prior trial, a suppression hear-
ing, a preliminary hearing, or any other proceeding at 
which testimony is taken under oath, subject to penalty of 
perjury, and subject to cross-examination qualify under 
Rule 801(D)(1)(a). In contrast to the federal rule, state-
ments made before a grand jury do not qualify because 
such statements are not subject to cross-examination at 
the time they are made. Grand jury statements, however, 
are admissible if inconsistent with the witness' trial 
testimony and offered for impeachment. See Rule 613. 
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Rule 801(D)(1)(b) provides that prior consistent state-
ments of a witness are admissible as substantive 
evidence if "offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive." For example, a statement made 
before the state's offer of leniency, the alleged motive for 
fabrication, is admissible. State v. Mullins, 34 Ohio 
App.3d 192, 196, 517 N.E.2d 945 (Fairfield 1986). 
The rule represents a change in Ohio law. Under prior 
law, prior consistent statements were generally inadmis-
sible, even if offered only for rehabilitation. Such state-
ments were admissible, however, if offered to rebut a 
charge of recent fabrication, Miller v. Piqua Transfer & 
Storage Co., 57 Ohio Abs. 325, 92 N.E.2d 452 (C.P. 
1950), in which case the statement could be considered 
for rehabilitative purposes but not as substantive 
evidence. Under the rule, such statements are substan-
tively admissible. 
The rule is identical to Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 
except for technical differences. In contrast to the rule on 
prior inconsistent statements, Rule 801(D)(1)(a), a prior 
consistent statement need not have been given under 
oath, subject to penalty of perjury, and subject to cross-
examination. 
In Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vance, 21 Ohio App.3d 
205, 486 N.E.2d 1206 (Franklin 1985), the court wrote: 
Because the result of exclusion of prior consistent 
statements, where they are sought to be used for 
rebuttal purposes, would be to permit an implication of 
fabrication or falsification to stand without challenge, 
their admission should be favored to the extent that a 
generous view should be taken of the entire trial set-
ting in order to determine if there was sufficient impeach-
ment of the witness to amount to a charge of fabrica-
tion or improper influence or motivation. /d. at 207. 
STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION 
Rule 801(D)(1)(c) provides that a witness' prior state-
ment "of identification of a person soon after perceiving" 
that person is admissible as substantive evidence "if the 
circumstances demonstrate the reliability of the prior 
identification." For example, an identification made at a 
lineup, show-up, photographic display, or prior hearing, 
falls within the rule. Even though statements of identifica-
tion are a type of prior consistent statement, the limita-
tions of Rule 801(D)(1)(b) do not apply to such statements. 
Prior law 
The rule apparently changes Ohio law. RC 2945.44 
provides: "When identification of the defendant is an issue, 
a witness who has on a previous occasion identified such 
person may testify to such previous identification. Such 
identification may be proved by other witnesses." On its face, 
this statute appears to permit the substantive use of prior 
identifications. In State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St.2d 83, 267 
N.E.2d 291 (1971), however, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the statute as permitting the use of prior identifications only 
as corroborative, rather than substantive, evidence. /d. 
(syllabus, para. 5). Under the corroboration theory, the 
witness had to make an in-court identification before 
evidence of a prior identification could be admitted. 
Under the rule, prior identifications are admissible as 
substantive evidence; thus, the rule applies whether or not 
the witness makes an identification at trial. So long as the 
witness who has made the prior identification is "subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement" at trial, the 
statement regarding the prior identification, as well as the 
testimony of other witnesses who were present at the time 
of the identification, is admissible. See Staff Note. 
Federal rule 
The rule differs from its federal counterpart. Statements 
concerning prior identifications are admissible only upon a 
showing that the "circumstances demonstrate the reliabili-
ty of the prior identification." The federal rule does not 
contain this requirement. The reliability requirement is 
patterned after Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), 
which contains the phrase "if the court is satisfied that 
the circumstances of the prior identification demonstrate 
the reliability of the prior identification." The Committee 
Comment to the Minnesota rule states: 
The rationale for the rule stems from the belief that if 
the original identification procedures were conducted 
fairly, the prior identification would tend to be more 
probative than an identification at trial. Obviously, if the 
prior identification did not occur under circumstances 
insuring its trustworthiness, the identification should 
not be admissible. The Court must be satisfied as to 
the trustworthiness of the out-of-court identification 
before allowing it to be introduced as substantive 
evidence. 
Confrontation 
In United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered the applicability of 
Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(c). John Foster, a correctional 
counselor, was assaulted in a federal prison. He suffered 
a fractured skull, which resulted in an impaired memory. 
While hospitalized, he identified Owens as his attacker 
and picked his picture from an array of photographs. At 
trial, Foster testified about the attack, including his iden-
tification of Owens while in the hospital. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he could not 
remember seeing his assailant. Owens was convicted 
and appealed on hearsay and confrontation grounds. 
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On review, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Confrontation Clause did not bar testimony concerning a 
prior out-of-court identification when the identifying 
witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain 
the basis for the identification. According to the Court, 
the Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination. This right is satisfied when the defen-
dant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as a 
bad memory. 
The Court also considered a hearsay objection. Feder-
al Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) excludes from the hearsay 
rule aprior statement "of identification of a person made 
after perceiving the person," if the declarant "testifies at 
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement." The Court ruled that the 
requirements of this provision had been satisfied. The 
witness had been subjected to cross-examination 
"concerning the statement." He was placed on the stand, 
took the oath, and responded willingly to questions. 
Constitutional requirements 
As the Staff Note indicates, the rule does not "obviate 
constitutional requirements relating to lineups and the 
like ... "The rule covers only the hearsay aspects of 
pretrial identifications. In criminal cases identification 
evidence also must satisfy Sixth Amendment and due 
process requirements. The Sixth Amendment requires 
the presence of counsel at some types of identification 
procedures. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) 
(preliminary hearings); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 
(1973) (right to counsel not applicable at photographic 
display); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to 
counsel attaches at commencement of judicial adversary 
proceedings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
Due process requires that identification evidence be 
reliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 4:: ~U.S. 98 (1977); 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). The Ohio cases are 
discussed in Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and Seizure ch. 
33 (2d ed. 1987). 
Mug shots 
An in-court identification cannot be bolstered by the 
use of photographs that reveal the defendant's prior 
criminal record. In State v. Breedlove, 26 Ohio St.2d 178, 
271 N.E.2d 238 (1971}, the Supreme Court stated, "Under 
the circumstances in the case at bar, we believe it 
unjustifiable for the state, on direct examination, to pres-
ent police mug shots, bearing police identification 
numbers, from which a reasonable inference can be 
drawn that the defendant, at some indefinite time in the 
past had had trouble with the law." /d. at 184. See also 
State v. Wilkinson, 26 Ohio St.2d 185, 271 N.E.2d 242 
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 968 (1971}. In effect, 
evidence indicating a prior criminal record violates Rule 
404(A), which generally prohibits the introduction of 
character evidence. 
ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY-OPPONENT 
Rule 801(0)(2} exempts admissions of a party-
opponent from the scope of the hearsay rule. The Rule 
recognizes several different types of admissions, three of 
which are often encountered in criminal cases: (1) 
individual admissions; (2) adoptive admissions; and (3) 
co-conspirator admissions. 
According to the Staff Note "[u]nder prior Ohio law, an 
admission was characterized as an exception to the 
::~ hearsay rule." Instead of treating admissions as an 
exception, the Evidence Rules exempt admissions from 
the definition of hearsay. 
According to the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule 801, admissions of party-opponents "are excluded 
from the category of hearsay on the theory that their 
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary 
system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the 
hearsay rule." In other words, the adversary system 
imposes upon a party the burden of explaining his prior 
statements that are inconsistent with his·current position. 
In any event, although the theory of admissibility is 
changed by the Rules of Evidence, the result is generally 
the same as under prior law. 
Declarations against interest distinguished 
Admissions are often confused with the hearsay 
exception relating to declarations against interest, which 
is governed by Rule 804(b)(3). See Goz v. Tenney, 104 
Ohio St. 500, 505, 136 N.E. 215, 216 (1922). There are 
several differences between the two rules. First, the first-
hand knowledge and competency rules do not apply to 
admissions; these rules do apply to declarations against 
interest. Second, to qualify as an admission, a statement 
need not have been against the interest of the declarant 
when made; the declaration against interest exception 
turns on the adverse nature of the statement when it was 
~\ made. Third, the declarant need not be unavailable in if'., 
order for an admission to be introduced. In contrast, a 
declaration against interest is not admissible unless the 
declarant is unavailable at the time of trial. Finally, decla-
rations against interest need not be made by a party. See 
Ferrebee v. Boggs, 24 Ohio App.2d 18, 24-25, 263 N.E.2d 
574, 579 (1970); McCormick, Evidence § 262 (3d ed. 
1984); Note, Admissions "Against Interest" in Ohio, 15 
Ohio St. L.J. 187 (1954). 
INDIVIDUAL ADMISSIONS 
Rule 801(D)(2)(a) provides that statements of a party, in 
either his individual or representative capacity, are 
admissible as substantive evidence if offered against 
that party. However, a party cannot introduce his own 
statements under this rule. State v. Gatewood, 15 Ohio 
App.3d 14, 472 N.E.2d 63 (Hamilton 1984). 
Pleas of guilty 
A plea of guilty in a criminal case is an admission and 
thus may be admissible against a party-opponent in a 
subsequent case. See Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 
216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); Freas v. Sullivan, 130 Ohio 
St. 486, 200 N.E. 639 (1936); Clark v. Irvin, 9 Ohio 131 
(1839). Rule 410, however, precludes the admissibility of 
guilty pleas that are subsequently withdrawn, pleas of no 
~ contest, pleas of guilty in a violations bureau, offers to 
plead guilty and no contest, and statements made in 
connection with and relevant to such pleas and offers. 
Pleas of guilty that do not fall within the exclusion of Rule 
410 are admissible as admissions. 
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Confessions 
The confession of a criminal defendant is an admis-
sion of a party-opponent. Some Ohio cases attempt to 
distinguish confessions and admissions, characterizing 
confessions as a complete acknowledgment of guilt and 
admissions as something less. See State v. Klumpp, 15 
0.0.2d 461, 175 N.E.2d 767 (App. 1960). The distinction 
is usually not important. Both confessions and admis-
sions are admissible under Rule 801(D)(2)(A). State v. 
Byrd, 32 Ohio St.3d 79, 89, 512 N.E.2d 611 (1987), cert. 
denied 108 S.Ct. 763 (1988). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held the distinction irrelevant when a state-
ment obtained from a defendant by the police is 
challenged on constitutional grounds. See Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966). 
Rule 801(D)(2)(A) governs only the hearsay aspects of 
admissions. It is not concerned with the constitutional 
requirements surrounding the obtaining of statements 
from defendants by the police. See Miranda v. Arizona, 
supra (5th Amendment requirements); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (6th Amendment require-
ments). See generally Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and 
Seizure ch. 31 (2d ed. 1987). 
Like many jurisdictions, Ohio imposes a corroboration 
requirement on the admissibility of confessions. Under 
this rule, there must be some independent evidence of 
the corpus delicti before a confession is admissible. See 
State v. Black, 54 Ohio St.2d 304, 376 N.E.2d 948 (1978); 
State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 
(1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); 
State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916); 
State v. King, 10 Ohio App.3d 161, 460 N.E.2d 383 
(Hamilton 1983); State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396, 457 
N.E.2d 834 (Hamilton 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 
(1983); State v. Ralston, 67 Ohio App.2d 81, 425 N.E.2d 
916 (1979). See generally McCormick, Evidence§ 158 (3d 
ed. 1984); 7 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2070-75 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1978). 
ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS 
Rule 801(D)(2)(b) provides that a statement about 
which a party "has manifested his adoption or belief in its 
truth" is admissible as substantive evidence if offered 
against that party. The Advisory Committee's Note to 
Federal Rule 801 contains the following commentary: 
Under established principles an admission may be 
made by adopting or acquiescing in the statement of 
another. While knowledge of contents would ordinarily 
be essential, this is not inevitably so: "X is a reliable 
person and knows what he is talking about." See 
McCormick§ 246, p. 527, n. 15. Adoption or acquies-
cence may be manifested in any appropriate manner. 
When silence is relied upon, the theory is that the 
person would, under the circumstances, protest the 
statement made in his presence, if untrue. The deci-
sion in each case calls for an evaluation in terms of 
probable human behavior. In civil cases, the results 
have generally been satisfactory. In criminal cases, 
however, troublesome questions have been raised by 
decisions holding that failure to deny is an admission: 
the inference is a fairly weak one, to begin with; silence 
may be motivated by advice of counsel or realization 
that "anything you say may be used against you"; 
unusual opportunity is afforded to manufacture 
evidence; and encroachment upon the privilege 
againstself-incrimination seems inescapably to be 
involved. 
A party may expressly adopt the statement of a third 
person or he may acquiesce by failing to deny or correct 
the statement of a third person under circumstances in 
which it would be natural to deny or correct the truth of 
the statement (adoption by silence). See State v. Swiger, 
5 Ohio St.2d 151, 160, 214 N.E.2d 417, 424, cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 874 (1966) (express adoption); Price v. Cleve-
land Clinic Foundation, 33 Ohio App.3d 301, 307, 515 
N.E.2d 931 (Cuyahoga 1986) (adoption by conduct); 
State v. Poole, 50 Ohio App.2d 204, 362 N.E.2d 678 
(1976) (express adoption). 
Adoption by silence 
The Ohio cases have recognized the admission-by-
silence rule. See Hoover v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41, 47, 109 
N.E. 626, 628 (1914); Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 
(1881); Accurate Employment Service v. Rowell, 69 Ohio 
Abs. 452, 455, 126 N.E.2d 81, 84 (C.P. 1954). In Zeller v. 
State, 123 Ohio St. 519, 176 N.E. 81 (1931), the Supreme 
Court stated: "The only theory upon which any confes-
sion by silence is admissible is that the statement of the 
third per~on, in the presence of the accused, is made 
under such circumstances that the silence of the 
accused gives rise to a natural and reasonable inference 
of assent thereto ... " /d. at 523. 
In many cases, however, the courts have found that the 
circumstances did not require a response and thus, 
silence was not equivalent to assent. E.g., Zeller v. State, 
supra; Geigerv, State, 70 Ohio St. 400, 71 N.E. 721 
(1904); Griffith v. Zipperwick and Lodge, 28 Ohio St. 388, 
409 (1876); Walker v. State, 37 OhioApp. 540, 175 N.E. 29 
(1930). See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 71 (1975). 
In Geiger, supra the Court commented on the admissibili-
ty of "a confession by silence": "We cannot refrain from 
the observation, that before a court admits this class of 
confessions, great caution should be exercised ... It is 
not every instance of silence in the hearing of accusation 
that renders it admissible, as admitting guilt." /d. at 413. 
These cases are consistent with McCormick's position 
that "the essential inquiry in each case is whether a 
reasonable person would have denied under the circum-
stances ... " McCormick, Evidence § 270, at 801 (3d ed. 
1984). It is not sufficient that the statement was made in 
the presence of a party. McCormick lists several factors 
that should be considered in determining admissibility: 
(1) The statement must have been heard by the party 
claimed to have acquiesced. (2) It must have been 
understood by him. (3) The subject matter must have 
been within his knowledge ... (4) Physical or emotional 
impediments to responding must not be present. (5) 
The personal makeup of the speaker, e.g., young child, 
or his relationship to the party or the event, e.g., 
bystander, may be such as to make it unreasonable to 
expect a denial. (6) Probably most important of all, the 
statement itself must be such as would, if untrue, call 
for a denial under the circumstances. /d. 
The adoption-by-silence rule also may apply to 
correspondence, that is, the failure to answer or correct 
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statements in a letter may be considered to be an adop-
tion if under the circumstances it would have been natu-
ral to answer or object to the contents of the letter. See 
Akron Milk Producers, Inc. v. lsaly Dairy Co., 109 Ohio 
App. 155, 164 N.E.2d 579 (1959) (adoption); Wolfson v. 
Horn, 94 Ohio App. 530, 116 N.E.2d 751 (1953) (adop-
tion); Aftel v. Cound, 32 Ohio App. 270, 167 N.E. 402 
(1928) (no adoption)i McCormick, Evidence § 270 {3d ed. 
1984). As in all cases of adoption by silence, the surround-
ing circumstances are critical. In A. B. Leach & Co., Inc. 
v. Peirson, 275 U.S. 120 (1927), Justice Holmes wrote: 
A man cannot make evidence for himself by writing 
a letter containing the statements that he wishes to 
prove~Re~Cfoesnofmal<ectheletter evidence by send-
ing it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the 
facts. He no more can impose a duty to answer a 
charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending 
goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse 
assertions in the absence of further circumstances 
making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as 
an admission. /d. at 128. 
Criminal cases 
The application of the adoption-by-silence rule in crimi-
nal cases is limited by constitutional principle'. In State 
v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St.2d 76,263 N.E.2d 77.:5 (1970), the 
Supreme Court commented on the admissibility of a 
defendant's silence following arrest: 
In the first detention of a suspect it is not uncommon 
to react by refusing to discuss the charges until a 
lawyer can be retained. Desire for friendly counsel and 
advice can be a major motivation at the time in the 
mind of one completely innocent of the charges, as 
well as one who subsequently may admit his guilt. His 
privilege [against self-incrimination] at that time is 
silence ... he should notthereafter be penalized for 
his original refusal. /d. at 81. 
See also State v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St. 3d 279, 284, 513 
N.E.2d 311 (1987) (conclusory statements of deputies not 
adoptive admissions); State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 
14, 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 
438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Young, 27 Ohio St.2d 310, 
272 N.E.2d 353 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 
U.S. 940 (1972) (waiver of the privilege). In Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
examination of a defendant at trial concerning his post-
arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings violated 
due process. Consequently, a defendant's silence in face 
of an accusation by the police cannot be admitted in 
evidence if Miranda warnings were given. 
CO-CONSPIRATOR ADMISSIONS 
Rule 801(D)(2)(e) provides that a statement made by a 
co-conspirator of a party during and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is admissible as substantive evidence if 
offered against that party. The rule applies in civil as well 
as in criminal cases. See Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 1 
(1861). 
The theory underlying the co-conspirator rule is 
unclear. In an early Ohio case, the Supreme Court stated 
that "the act and declaration of each [co-conspirator] in 
prosecution of the enterprise, and while engaged in 
accomplishing the common design, is to be considered 
the act and declaration of all, each being deemed the 
agent of all." Patton v. State, 6 Ohio St. 467, 470 (1856). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801, 
however, rejects the agency theory. "[T)he agency theory 
of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as 
a basis for admissibility beyond that already estab-
lished." The Note, however, fails to provide an alternative 
theory to justify admissibility. See generally 4 Louisell & 
Mueller, Federal Evidence 362-67 (1980); 4 Weinstein & 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence§ 801(d)(2)(E)[01) (1988). 
The co-conspirator rule applies if five conditions are 
established: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) the 
defendant's participation in the conspiracy; (3) the 
declarant's participation in the conspiracy; (4) the state-
ment was made during the course of the conspiracy; and 
(5) the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
These conditions are discussed below. If the statement 
was part of the agreement (the actus reus of conspiracy), 
the statement may be admissible under the verbal acts 
doctrine, and resort to this rule is unnecessary. See 4 
Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence 357-61 (1980). 
Existence of the conspiracy 
The rule applies only if the prosecution has estab-
lished the existence of a conspiracy. Conspiracy has 
been defined as requiring "(1) an agreement between 
two or more persons ... and (2) an intent to thereby 
achieve a certain objective which, under the common law 
definition, is the doing of either an unlawful act or a 
lawful act by unlawful means." LaFave & Scott, Criminal 
Law 525 (2d ed. 1986). 
The crime of conspiracy, however, need not be 
charged in the indictment or information in order to 
invoke the rule. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
comments: "While the rule refers to a co-conspirator, it is 
this committee's understanding that the rule is meant to 
carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a 
joint venturer is considered as a co-conspirator for the 
purposes of this rule even though no conspiracy has 
been charged." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Gong. Ad. News 7051, 7073. 
This position is consistent with prior Ohio law. See State 
v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947), cert. 
denied, 331 U.S. 839 (1947); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 
457 (1889). 
Declarant's and defendant's participation 
With one exception, the statement must have been 
made while both the declarant and the defendant were 
members of the conspiracy. The exception involves the 
jefendant who joins an on-going conspiracy, in which 
~ase the defendant is deemed to have adopted all prior 
>tatements made by the other co-conspirators. See Unit-
3d States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 
393 (1948). 
Hence, if the defendant withdraws from the conspiracy 
Jefore the objectives are achieved or abandoned, state-
nents made by other co-conspirators after his withdrawal 
~re not admissible against him. Moreover, the arrest of 
he declarant terminates his participation in the conspira-
:y and makes his post-arrest statements inadmissible 
lgainst the defendant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 
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371 U.S. 471 (1963); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 
(1946). Similarly, the defendant's arrest usually 
terminates his participation in the conspiracy and makes 
subsequent statements by co-conspirators inadmissible 
against him. 
During the course of the conspiracy 
The rule requires that the statement be made "during 
the course" of the conspiracy. The prior Ohio cases had 
recognized this requirement. In Patton v. State, 6 Ohio St. 
467 (1856), the Supreme Court held that one of the limita-
tions on the admissibilitY'of co-conspirator statements 
was that the statement must be made "during the 
pendency of the criminal enterprise ... " /d. (syllabus); 
accord, Sharpe v. State, 29 Ohio St. 263 (1876); Rufer v. 
State, 25 Ohio St. 464 (1874); Fouts v. State, 7 Ohio St. 
471 (1857). 
A conspiracy commences when the agreement is 
reached and terminates when the objectives have been 
achieved or abandoned. Statements of co-conspirators 
made after the conspiracy ends are not admissible. See 
Sharpe v. State, supra. Determining the time when the 
conspiracy terminates, however, has proven trouble-
some. The majority view is that statements made after 
the objectives have been achieved, but while the conspi-
rators are attempting to avoid detection (the concealment 
phase) are inadmissible. See McCormick, Evidence 793 
(3d ed. 1984). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has not always followed this 
rule. In State v. Shelton, 51 Ohio St.2d 1152 (1977), vacat-
ed on other grounds, 438 U.S. 909 (1978), the Court held: 
"A declaration of a conspirator, made subsequent to the 
actual commission of the crime, may be admissible 
against any co-conspirator if it was made while the 
conspirators were still concerned with the concealment 
of their criminal conduct or their identity." /d. (syllabus, 
para. 2); accord, State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 
587, 433 N.E.2d 561 (1982) (during conspiracy or "result-
ing coverup"); State v. DeRighter, 145 Ohio St. 552, 
558-59,62 N.E.2d 332,335-36 (1945). 
Concealment phase statements, however, may not be 
admissible under Rule 801(0)(2)(e). The Advisory 
Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801 reads: "The rule is 
consistent with the position of the Supreme Court in 
denying admissibility to statements made after the objec-
tives of the conspiracy have either failed or been 
achieved. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 
(1949); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 
(1963)." The federal rule, as stated in Kru/ewitch and 
Wong Sun, has consistently excluded concealment 
phase statements. See Anderson v. United States, 417 
U.S. 211, 218 (1974); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 
(1970); McCormick, Evidence 646 (2d ed. 1971) 
("attempts to expand the so-called 'concealment phase' 
to include all efforts to avoid detection have generally 
failed, as in Krulewitch v. United States ... "). 
Although the rule may be inconsistent with the sylla-
bus statement in Shelton, supra, it is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the facts of Shelton. The statement in 
that case was made just an hour after the crime, while 
the co-conspirator was attempting to dispose of the 
murder weapon. Such close proximity between the crime 
and statement may be sufficient to warrant admission of 
the statement. 
Under some circumstances; extending the duration 
of the conspiracy beyond the commission of the prin-
cipal crime to include concomitant and closely con-
nected disposition of its fruits or concealment of its 
traces appears justifiable, as in the case of police 
officers engaged in writing up a false report to conceal 
police participation in a burglary or disposal of the body 
after a murder. McCormick, Evidence 793 (3d ed. 1984). 
One recent case, however, has ruled that "conceal-
ment phase" statements are admissible under Ohio Rule 
801. State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396,401,457 N.E.2d 
834 (1982). 
It should be noted that this rule does not govern the 
admissibility of evidence of acts engaged in during the 
concealment phase. Such acts may be admissible if rele-
vant to prove the existence of the conspiracy. See Ander-
son v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-22, (1974); Lutwak 
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1953). 
In furtherance of the conspiracy 
The rule requires that the statement be made "in 
furtherance of the conspiracy." Numerous prior Ohio 
cases had recognized this requirement without discuss-
ing its basis. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 
240-41,364 N.E.2d 224,235 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio 
St.2d 135, 143, 359 N.E.2d 78, 84 (1976), vacated on 
other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Carver, 30 
Ohio St.2d 280,285 N.E.2d 26 (1972), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1044 (1972); State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 
N.E.2d 258 (1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 839 (1947); 
G()ir1S v. ~t(i~(3. ~6 ()hio St. 457,_g1 N.E. 476 (1889); Kent 
v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426, 430 (1884); Rufer v. State, 25 
Ohio St. 464 (1874); Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 1 
(1861); Fouts v. State, 7 Ohio St. 471 (1857); Patton v. 
State, 6 Ohio St. 467 (1856). 
Statements that are only casual admissions or merely 
inform the listener of the declarant's activities are not 
made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Statements that 
provide assurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesive-
ness among the conspirators, or inform each conspirator 
of the current status of the conspiracy do further the ends 
of the conspiracy and are admissible. Similarly, state-
ments that seek to induce someone into joining the 
conspiracy or assist the conspirators in meeting their 
objectives are admissible. See also 4 Louisell & Mueller, 
Federal Evidence 348 (1980) ("Idle chit-chat, mere brag-
ging, descriptive comments, and statements deliberately 
inculpating other conspirators and knowingly made to 
law enforcement agents are clearly excluded by this 
requirement ... "). 
Independent evidence; standard of proof 
The Ohio rule expressly requires that the conspiracy, 
as well as the declarant's and defendant's participation, 
be established "upon independent proof of the conspira-
cy." In other words, the statement itself cannot be used to 
establish the existence of the conspiracy. Federal prac-
tice is different. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. , 107 
S.Ct. 2775 (1987). 
The independent proof requirement is based on Michi-
gan Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and is consistent with 
prior Ohio cases. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 
240, 364 N.E.2d 224, 235 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978) (conspiracy established by 
"other evidence"); State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St.2d 1.35, 
143,359 N.E.2d 78, 84 (1976), vacated on other drounds, 
438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Carver, 30 Ohio St.2d 280, 
287, 285 N.E.2d 26, 31 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 
(1972). 
The defendant's own admissions, which are admissi-
ble under Rule 801(D)(2)(a), however, are independent 
evidence and thus may be used to establish, the 
conspiracy. State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396. 401,457 
N.E.2d834(1983). 
The standard of proof in determining admissibility may 
differ in federal and Ohio cases. In Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S., 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987}, the I .S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the trial court in determining the admissi-
bility of co-conspirator statements must use the "prepon-
derance of evidence" standard of proof. 
Prior to the adoption of the Rule of Evidence, the Ohio 
cases had used the prima facie case standard. See State 
v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St. 2d 223,232,400 N.E.2d 401,407 
(1980); State v. Weind, supra, 50 Ohio St.2d at 240; State 
v. Osborne, supra, at 143; State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 
263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 839 
(1947); State v. DeRighter, 145 Ohio St. 552, 558-59, 62 
N.E.2d 332, 335-36 (1945); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 
457, 21 N.E. 476 (1889). Recent cases continue to use 
the prima facie case standard. State v. Martin, 9 Ohio 
App.3d 150, 151, 458 N.E.2d 898 (1983); State v. Milo, 6 
Ohio App.3d 19, 22, 451 N.E.2d 1253 (1982). 
Right of confrontation. 
Generally, the Sixth Amendment requires the prosecu-
tion to demonstrate both the unavailability of the declar-
antahd the reliability of the ollt-oH:ourt deClaration. In 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S., 107 S.Ct. 2775, 
(1987), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that co-conspirator 
statements automatically satisfied the reliability require-
ment imposed by the Confrontation Clause, because 
they fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." In 
United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the Court held 
that the unavailability of the declarant need not be estab-
lished as condition for admitting co-conspirator state-
ments. 
